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We present a novel computational model that describes action perception as an active
inferential process that combines motor prediction (the reuse of our own motor system to
predict perceived movements) and hypothesis testing (the use of eye movements to
disambiguate amongst hypotheses). The system uses a generative model of how (arm and
hand) actions are performed to generate hypothesis-specific visual predictions, and directs
saccades to the most informative places of the visual scene to test these predictions e and
underlying hypotheses. We test the model using eye movement data from a human action
observation study. In both the human study and our model, saccades are proactive
whenever context affords accurate action prediction; but uncertainty induces a more
reactive gaze strategy, via tracking the observed movements. Our model offers a novel
perspective on action observation that highlights its active nature based on prediction
dynamics and hypothesis testing.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).111
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1231. Introduction
The ability to recognize the actions of others and understand
their underlying intentions is essential for adaptive success in
social environments e and we humans excel in this ability. It
has long been known that brain areas such as superior tem-
poral sulcus (STS) are particularly sensitive to the kinematice Sciences and Technolo
r.it (G. Pezzulo).
Elsevier Ltd. This is an ope
mma, F., et al., Action pand dynamical signatures of biological movement that permit
its fast recognition (Giese & Poggio, 2003; Puce& Perrett, 2003).
However, the neuronal and computational mechanisms
linking the visual analysis of movement kinematics and the
recognition of the underlying action goals are more
contentious.gies, National Research Council, Via S. Martino della Battaglia, 44,
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CORTEX1929_proof ■ 13 February 2017 ■ 2/16In principle, the recognition of action goals might be
implemented in perceptual and associative brain areas,
similar to the way other events such as visual scenes are
(believed to be) recognized, predicted and understood
semantically. However, two decades of research on action
perception and mirror neurons have shown that parts of the
motor system deputed to specific actions are also selectively
active during the observation of the same actionswhen others
perform them. Based on this body of evidence, several re-
searchers have proposed that themotor systemmight support
e partially or totally e action understanding and other func-
tions in social cognition (Kilner & Lemon, 2013; Rizzolatti &
Craighero, 2004). Some theories propose an automatic mech-
anism of motor resonance, according to which the action goals
of the performer are “mirrored” in the motor system of the
perceiver, thus permitting an automatic understanding
(Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). Other theories
highlight the importance of (motor) prediction and the covert
reuse of our ownmotor repertoire and internal models in this
process. For example, one influential proposal is that STS,
premotor and parietal areas are arranged hierarchically (in a
so-called predictive coding architectural scheme) and form an
internal generative model that predicts action patterns (at the
lowest hierarchical level) as well as understanding action
goals (at the higher hierarchical level). These hierarchical
processes interact continuously through reciprocal top-down
and bottom-up exchanges between hierarchical levels, so that
action understanding can be variously influenced by action
dynamics as well as various forms of prior knowledge; such as
the context in which the action occurs (Friston, Mattout, &
Kilner, 2011; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). Numerous other
theories point to the importance of different mechanisms
besides mirroring and motor prediction, such as Hebbian
plasticity or visual recognition (Fleischer, Caggiano, Thier, &
Giese, 2013; Heyes, 2010; Keysers & Perrett, 2004), see Giese
and Rizzolatti (2015) for a recent review. However, these the-
ories implicitly or explicitly consider action observation as a
rather passive task, disregarding its enactive aspects, such as
the role of active information sampling and proactive eye
movements.
In everyday activities involving goal-directed arm move-
ments, perception is an active and not a passive task (Ahissar
& Assa, 2016; Bajcsy, Aloimonos, & Tsotsos, 2016; O'Regan &
Noe, 2001); and eye movements are proactive, foraging for
information required in the near future. Indeed, eyes typically
shift toward objects that will be eventually acted upon, while
being rarely attracted to action irrelevant objects (Land, 2006;
Land, Mennie, & Rusted, 1999; Rothkopf, Ballard, & Hayhoe,
2007). In a seminal study (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003),
showed that when people observe object-related manual ac-
tions (e.g., block-stacking actions), the coordination between
their gaze and the actor's hand is very similar to the gaze-hand
coordination when they perform those actions themselves. In
both cases, people proactively shift their gaze to the target
sites, thus anticipating the outcome of the actions. These
findings suggest that oculomotor plans that support action
performance can be reused for action observation (Flanagan&
Johansson, 2003) and might also support learning and causalPlease cite this article in press as: Donnarumma, F., et al., Action p
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016understanding of these tasks (Gredeb€ack & Falck-Ytter, 2015;
Sailer, Flanagan, & Johansson, 2005).
Here we describe and test a novel computational model of
action understanding and accompanying eye movements.
The model elaborates the predictive coding framework of ac-
tion observation (Friston et al., 2011; Kilner et al., 2007) but
significantly extends it by considering the specific role of
active information sampling. The model incorporates two
main hypotheses. First, while most studies implicitly describe
action observation as a passive task, we cast it as an active,
hypothesis testing process that uses a generative model of how
different actions are performed to generate hypothesis-
specific predictions, and directs saccades to the most infor-
mative (i.e., salient) parts of the visual scene e in order to test
these predictions and in turn disambiguate among the
competing hypotheses (Friston, Adams, Perrinet, &
Breakspear, 2012). Second, the generative model that drives
oculomotor plans across action performance and observation
is the same, which implies that the motor system drives
predictive eye movements in ways that are coherent with the
unfolding of goal-directed action plans (Costantini,
Ambrosini, Cardellicchio, & Sinigaglia, 2014; Elsner,
D'Ausilio, Gredeb€ack, Falck-Ytter, & Fadiga, 2013).
We tested our computational model against human data
on eyemovement dynamics during an action observation task
(Ambrosini, Costantini, & Sinigaglia, 2011). In the action
observation study, participants' eye movements were recor-
ded while they viewed videos of an actor performing an un-
predictable goal-directed hand movement toward one of two
objects (targets) mandating two different kinds of grip (i.e., a
small object requiring a precision grip or a big object requiring
a power grasp). To counterbalance the hand trajectories and
ensure hand position was not informative about the actor's
goal, actions were recorded from the side using four different
target layouts. Before the hand movement, lasting 1000 msec,
the videos showed the actor's hand resting on a table (imme-
diately in front of his torso) with a fixation cross superimposed
on the hand (1000 msec). Participants were asked to fixate the
cross and to simply watch the videos without further in-
structions. In half of the videos, the actor preformed a reach-
to-grasp action during which the preshaping of the hand
(either a precision or a power grasp, depending on the target)
was clearly visible as soon as themovement started (preshape
condition), whereas in the remaining half, the actor merely
reached for e and touched e one of the objects with a closed
fist; that is, without preshaping his hand according to the
target features (no shape condition). Therefore, there were
four movement types, corresponding to the four conditions of
a two factor design (pre-shape and target size); namely, no
shapeebig target, no shapeesmall target, pre-shapeebig
target and pre-shapeesmall target. The four conditions were
presented in random order so that the actor's movement and
goal could not be anticipated. The main result of this study
was that participants' gaze proactively reached the target ob-
ject significantly earlier when motor cues (i.e., the preshaping
hand) were available. In what follows, we offer a formal
explanation of this anticipatory visual foraging in terms of
active inference.
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Our computational model uses gaze and active salient infor-
mation sampling to resolve uncertainty about the action being
observed (Friston et al., 2012); i.e., a power grasp to a big object
or a precision grip to a small object. The basic idea behind
active information sampling rests on resolving uncertainty
about the causes of sensations: namely, the action (cause) that
explains the observedmovements (sensations). In this setting,
salience scores the information gain (or resolution of uncer-
tainty) afforded by sampling information from a particular
domain; here, a location in the visual field. To evaluate the
salience (or epistemic value) of a putative saccade, it is
necessary to predict what will be sampled from that location.
In the active inference framework, predictions derive from
internal generative models that essentially encode the probabi-
listic relations between causes (actions) and sensations (hand
movements). Given a particular hypothesis (e.g., an actor
reaching for a big object), the generative model can then
predict the consequence of a saccade to a particular location
(e.g., that a hand should be configured in power grasp). The
resulting information gain, as measured by the reduction in
posterior uncertainty under the expected outcome, then
specifies the salience or epistemic value of the saccade e as a
saccade to the hand location can test the predictions gener-
ated under the competing hypotheses (e.g., seeing the hand is
configured in a power grip provides evidence for the hypoth-
esis that the actor is reaching for a big object).
In our simulations, we evaluate the salience (epistemic
value) of sampling every visual location under two competing
hypotheses (the actor reaching for a big or a small object) and
then weight the ensuing saliency maps by the posterior
probability of each hypothesis. This corresponds to a Bayesian
model average of salience maps over hypotheses (Penny,
Mattout, & Trujillo-Barreto, 2006). Crucially, in the action
observation setup considered here, this is an on-going pro-
cess, because each new sensory sample changes posterior
beliefs and therefore changes the (Bayesian model average)
saliency map. Action observation is thus a process that un-
folds in time, guided by active sampling of information that is
most relevant (salient) to adjudicate among competing
hypotheses.
Note that this definition of salience goes beyond (local)
aspects of the visual input to consider goal-related informa-
tion. Usually, salience is defined on the basis of visual fea-
tures. In contrast, in active inference, salience is an attribute
of a putative action; for example, where to look next. In this
setting, salience is defined as the information gain based
upon the expected resolution of uncertainty about explana-
tions for sensory input. Mathematically, this epistemic value is
equivalent to the mutual information between the hidden
causes (explanations) and their sensory consequences, ex-
pected under a particular action (Friston et al., 2015). In this
sense, salience is only defined in relation to active sampling
of the environment, because it is a function of sensory
samples conditioned upon an action. In our context, salience
is brought further into the embodied or enactivist realm. This
is because the hypotheses that need to be resolved through
epistemic foraging are themselves contingent upon another'sPlease cite this article in press as: Donnarumma, F., et al., Action p
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016action. In the context of the action observation paradigm
studied above e unlike other visual search tasks e the task
requires an understanding of the action goal (e.g., ‘grasp the
big object’) e as opposed to just predicting a sequence of
video frames. The intentionality inherent in this task can be
inferred by engaging the same oculomotor plans (and asso-
ciated generative models) that support the execution of one's
own goal-directed actions; e.g., the plan to fixate and grasp a
big object (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). The implicit gener-
ative or forward models influence what is salient and what is
not salient in the visual scene. During action performance,
the target location is salient because it affords goal-directed
action. Reusing oculomotor plans for action observation
thus explains why the target location becomes salient when
it is recognized as the goal of the action e even before the
performer's hand reaches it. However, there is an important
difference between using oculomotor plans during action
execution and observation. During action execution, we
know the goal (e.g., big or small target). Hence, we know the
target location and can saccade directly to it, without looking
at our own hand. Conversely, during action observation, we
need to infer which target the actor has in mind (e.g., the
actor is reaching for the big target). To resolve uncertainty
about which target to look at, we can first look at the actor's
hand to see whether it is configured to pick up a small or
large target. This means that the most salient location in the
visual field changes as sensory evidence becomes available
(as disclosed by the hand configuration and trajectory) e and
subsequent changes in the observer's beliefs or hypotheses.
Crucially, one would predict anticipatory saccade to the
target object when, and only when, the actor's intentions or
goal are disclosed by the hand configuration.
In summary, if the agent is confident about the goal, it
should look at the target. However, if the agent is uncertain
about the goal, it first needs to execute epistemic actions (i.e.,
collect evidence by looking at the actor's hand). This suggests
that the salience of different locations (hand or objects)
changes dynamically as a function of the agent's beliefs e a
phenomenon that has been observed empirically (see above)
and that we reproduce using simulations of active inference.
The computational model is described in the next three
subsections. The first (architecture) rehearses active inference
and its essential variables, see Fig. 1A. The second (generative
models) describes the generative models of the two grasping
actions (precision grip to a small object or power grasp to a big
object) that predict the unfolding of hand movement kine-
matics and updating the saliency map (Fig. 1B). The third
(hypothesis testing) describes how the two competing percep-
tual hypotheses (the actor reaching for a big or a small object,
see Fig. 1C) are encoded and tested by saccadic sampling of the
most salient elements of the visual scene, and the saliency
map that underwrites this epistemic foraging.
2.1. Architecture
The architecture of the computational model is sketched in
Fig. 1. It follows the hierarchical form for generalized predic-
tive coding (Friston, 2010), where state and error units (black
and red units, respectively) are the variables of the systems
and are partitioned into cause (v), hidden (x) and control (u)erception as hypothesis testing, Cortex (2017), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 1 e Scheme of the computational model adopted in the study. The system implicitly encodes a (probabilistic) model of
which visual stimuli should be expected under the different perceptual hypotheses (e.g., if the action target is the big object,
when doing a saccade to the next hand position I should see a power grasp) and uses the saccades to check if these
expectations are correct e and in turn to revise the probability of the two hypotheses. Details of the procedure can be found
in the main text and in Friston et al. (2012). (B) The pulvinar saliency map receives as input the (expected) position of task-
relevant variables (e.g., expected hand position, to-be-grasped objects), weighted by their saliency, which in turn depends
on the probability of the two competing hypotheses. Neurophysiologically, we assume that a hierarchically organized
“action observation” brain network computes both the expected hand position (at lower hierarchical levels) and the
probability of the two competing hypotheses (at higher hierarchical levels). The inset shows a schematic of the functioning
of the action observation network according to predictive coding (Kilner et al., 2007). Here, action observation depends on
reciprocal message passing between areas that lie lower in the predictive coding hierarchy (STS) and areas higher areas
(parietal and prefrontal). The functioning of the action observation network is abstracted here using a Bayesian model
(Dindo et al., 2011), see the Methods section for details. (C) This panel represents graphically the two competing hypotheses
that are considered here. Note that here the hypotheses are not (only) about final states (hand on big vs small object) but
describe also how the action will unfold in time: they correspond to sequences of (superimposed) images of hand
trajectories (here we consider 6 time frames). As evident in the figure, the hypothesis that one is reaching for a small (or big)
object entails the hypothesis that the hand will be configured in a precision grip (or power grasp) during action execution e
and this hypothesis can be tested during action observation.
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 64
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
CORTEX1929_proof ■ 13 February 2017 ■ 4/16states; and the tilde notation ~m denotes variables in general-
ized coordinates of motion ðm;m0;m00 ;…Þ (Friston, 2008). In the
generative model, causal states link hierarchical levels (i.e.,
the output of one level provides input to the next); hidden
states encode dynamics over time; and hidden controls
encode representations of actions that affect transitions be-
tween hidden states. It is these control states from which
actions (e.g., saccades) are sampled.Please cite this article in press as: Donnarumma, F., et al., Action p
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016At the first hierarchical layer of the architecture, sensory
signals ðvð0Þ :¼ sÞ are generated in two modalities: proprio-
ception (p) and vision (q):
 Proprioceptive signals, encoded in sp2ℝ2, represent the
centre of gaze and have an associated (precision-weighted)
prediction error xv;p; i.e., the difference between condi-
tional expectations and predicted values.erception as hypothesis testing, Cortex (2017), http://dx.doi.org/
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visual scene uniformly with a grid of 16  16 sensors, and
have an associated (precision-weighted) prediction error
xv;q.
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1302.2. Hidden states include
 Proprioceptive internal states, which encode an internal
representation of the centre of oculomotor fixation. Their
corresponding expectation (i.e., neuronal activity) is
denoted as ~mx;p2ℝ
2 and their prediction error as xx;p.
 Perceptual internal states, encoding the (logarithm of the)
probability that each hypothesis is the cause of the visual
input. Their corresponding variational mode (i.e., neuronal
activity) is denoted as ~mx;q2ℝ
N and their prediction error as
xx;q.
Hidden controls ~u ¼ ~hu þ ~uu are modelled as 2D points ~hu
plus a Gaussian noise perturbation ~uu, and determine the
location that attracts gaze. Their corresponding expectation is
denoted as ~mu2ℝ
2 and their prediction error as xu.
Action a is modelled as classical reflex arc suppressing
proprioceptive prediction errors and producing saccadic
movements by solving the following equation: _a ¼ v~svaxð1Þv .
Defining qð~x; ~v; ~u
~mxðtþ tÞ; ~mvðtþ tÞ; ~hjÞ as the conditional den-
sity over hidden controls, parameterized by hidden states and
causes in the future, salience S can be defined as the negen-
tropy (inverse uncertainty) of the conditional density q:
S

~hj

¼ H
h
q

~x; ~v; ~u
~mxðtþ tÞ; ~mvðtþ tÞ; ~hji
Thus, the system aims to find the (eye) control that maxi-
mizes salience; i.e.,
~hu ¼ argmaxehj S
ehj

Or, more intuitively, sampling the most informative loca-
tions (given the current agent's belief state).
2.3. Generative models
The computational scheme introduced so far is generic and
implements active sampling of information in a variety of
perceptual tasks (Friston et al., 2012). In this paper, we use it
for an action observation task (Ambrosini et al., 2011), in
which the agent (observer) has two hypotheses about the
hidden causes of visual input. These hypotheses correspond
to reaching for a big object (with a power grip) or reaching for a
smaller object in a nearby location (with a precision grip). To
test these competing hypotheses, the architecture needs to
generate predictions about the current and future sensory
outcomes (i.e., observed hand movements and configura-
tions). These predictions are generated from a forward or
generative model of reach-to-grasp actions, enabling one to
accumulate evidence for different hypotheses e and to eval-
uate a salience map for the next saccade (see below). In
keeping with embodied and motor cognition theories, we
consider these generative models to be embodied in the so-
called action observation brain network, a network ofPlease cite this article in press as: Donnarumma, F., et al., Action p
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016sensorimotor brain regions that may support action under-
standing via the simulation of one's own action (Dindo,
Zambuto, & Pezzulo, 2011; Friston et al., 2011; Grafton, 2009;
Kilner et al., 2007; Pezzulo, 2013) and that includes both
cortical and subcortical structures (Bonini, 2016; Caligiore,
Pezzulo, Miall, & Baldassarre, 2013), see also Fig. 1B.
For simplicity, we implemented four generative sub-
models predicting the location and configuration of the hand
(preshape) under the two hypotheses (reaching for a big or
small object) separately. This allows the agent to accumulate
sensory evidence in two modalities (hand position and
configuration) for each of the two hypotheses. Furthermore,
these sub-models provided predictions of hand position and
configuration in the future, under the two hypotheses in
question.
These four probabilistic sub-models were learned on the
basis of hand movement data collected from six adult male
participants. Each participant executed 50 precision grip
movements directed to a small object (the small ball) and 50
power grasp movements directed to a big object (the big ball),
and data on finger and wrist angles were collected using a
dataglove (HumanGlove e Humanware S.r.l., Pontedera, Pisa,
Italy) endowed with 16 sensors (3 angles for each finger and 1
angle for the wrist). The four sub-models used in the simula-
tions were obtained by regressing the aforementioned data
(300 trials for each sub-model), to obtain probability distribu-
tions over the angles of the fingers and wrist, over time. To
regress each sub-model, we used a separate Echo State
Gaussian Processes (ESGP) (Chatzis & Demiris, 2011): an algo-
rithm that produced a predictive distribution over trajectories
of angles, under a particular sub-model, see Fig. 2A. The ESGP
sub-models were trained off-line to predict the content of the
next frame of the videos used in the experiments (6 frames)
and to map the angles of the fingers and wrist to the visual
appearance (preshape) and position in space of the hand,
respectively.
After the off-line learning phase, the four forward sub-
models generate a probabilistic prediction of the next hand
preshape and position based on all previous sensory images.
This enables the probability of the two competing hypotheses
to be evaluated, using the method described in Dindo et al.
(2011).
More formally, the first two sub-models encode the tra-
jectories traced by subjects' hands during the trials, thus
predicting the probability of the hand position in the image (as
Gaussians) under the hypothesis of grasping a small object
(SMALL):
pSMALLðhPosðtÞÞ ¼ pðhPosðtÞjhPosðt 1Þ;G ¼ SMALLÞ
and grasping a big object (BIG):
pBIGðhPosðtÞÞ ¼ pðhPosðtÞjhPosðt 1Þ;G ¼ BIGÞ
respectively.
Analogously, the second two sub-models encode the
probability of the hand configuration (preshape) in the image
under the hypothesis of a grasping a small object (SMALL):
pSMALLðhShapeðtÞÞ ¼ pðhShapeðtÞjhShapeðt 1Þ;G ¼ SMALLÞ
and grasping a big object (BIG):erception as hypothesis testing, Cortex (2017), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 2 e Graphical representation of how the (pulvinar)
saliency map used for the simulations is computed. The
map is the linear combination of four maps. (A) Each of the
first two maps represents the (expected) hand position
under the two hypotheses (POW is power grasp, PRE is
precision grip), and the corresponding saliency. In the
POW (or PRE) map, hand position is represented as a
Gaussian, whose centre is computed by a forward model of
hand position, conditioned on the power grasp (or precision
grip) hypothesis. The weight assigned to the POW (or PRE)
map in the computation of the saliency map (see below) is
the probability of power grasp (or precision grip) as
computed by a forward model of preshape information,
conditioned on the power grasp (or precision grip)
hypothesis. (B) The second two maps represent the
position and saliency of the two objects (BIG or SMALL),
given the current belief state of the agent. The position of
the BIG (or SMALL) object is different but fixed for each trial.
It is represented as a Gaussian centred on the object
position. The weight assigned to the BIG (or SMALL) map in
the computation of the final saliency map (see below)
depends on both the posterior probability that the BIG (or
SMALL) object multiplied by a term that reflects the current
distance between hand and BIG (or SMALL) position. (C)
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respectively.
Similarly, we encode the positions of the two objects,
small:
pSMALLðgPosðtÞÞ ¼ pðgPosðtÞjgPosðt 1Þ;G ¼ SMALLÞ
and big:
pBIGðgPosðtÞÞ ¼ pðgPosðtÞjgPosðt 1Þ;G ¼ BIGÞ
respectively. Note that for generality (and notational unifor-
mity) these are written as if they were a function of time.
However, objects have fixed positions during a trial; hence it is
not necessary to use an ESGP to calculate them.
In summary, we used a sophisticated (Echo-state Gaussian
process) model to generate predictions in two modalities and
thereby accumulate evidence for the two competing hypoth-
eses. The inversion of this forward model (or models) is
formally equivalent to Bayesian filtering or predictive coding,
but using a more flexible and bespoke generative model. In
turn, we will see below that the posterior beliefs (about loca-
tion and configuration of the hand and location of the target
object) are used to form Bayesian model averages of the
salience maps under competing hypotheses.
2.4. Hypothesis testing
Our action observation task can be described as a competition
between two alternative hypotheses (power grasp to the big
object vs precision grip to the small object). Importantly,
saccades are treated as “experiments” that gather evidence in
favour of each hypothesis e so that they can be disambigu-
ated. Given that this is a dynamic task and actions unfold in
time, the two competing hypotheses have to explain sequences
of images, and not a single frame; in other words, they have to
explain the whole trajectory and not just the final hand po-
sition: see Fig. 1C. This calls for sequential hypothesis testing
as the observed action unfolds.
The target of the next saccade is sampled from a saliency
map (see Fig. 1A), which evaluates the (epistemic and prag-
matic) value of sampling each location in the visual scene e
and is continuously updated during action observation. The
salience map comprises the Bayesian model average of four
component salience maps, based on local samples of the vi-
sual field (modelled with Gaussian windows): see Fig. 2. For
the hand salience map (Fig. 2A), we used the Bayesian model
average under the four sub-models generating position and
configuration, under reaching for big and small objects,
respectively. This captures the fact that the value of locations
where the agent expects to find a hand configured for a power
grasp or precision grip increases in relation to the estimated
probability of reaching the big or the small object. For theThe resulting saliency map is obtained as the weighted
combination of the four aforementionedmaps. This map is
filtered to be used by the system. (Note that the saliency
map shown here is an illustrative example, not a
superimposition of the four components).
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average of Gaussian windows centred on the object (which is
fixed), weighted by the probability of reaching big or small
object and the relative hand-object distance. This captures the
fact that the identity of the target object resolves more un-
certainty about the intended movement when the hand is
closer; i.e., approaching the object. Finally, the hand and ob-
ject salience maps were combined and down sampled (using
on-off centre-surround sampling) to obtain a smaller (16  16
grid) saliency map that is computationally more tractable
(Fig. 2C). Note that for clarity the combined map shown in
Fig. 2C is illustrative and it is not the true superimposition of
the four images above.
In detail, we compute Sk ¼ Sð~huÞ minðSð~huÞÞ, the differ-
ential salience for the kth saccade and enhance it by Rk, i.e.,
Sk ¼ Sk þ Rk with Rk corresponding to the map
Rk ¼
X4
j¼1
wjr

Sk; cj
þ a$Rk1
with a representing the weight of previous estimates, which is
set to 1/2 for coherence with (Friston et al., 2012). The ele-
ments of the equation are computed on the basis of the pre-
ceding ESGP models:
 r is a Gaussian function (with a standard deviation of 1/16
of the image size) of the distance from the points cj;
 c1  pSMALLðhPosðtþ 1ÞÞ and c2  pBIGðhPosðtþ 1ÞÞ are pre-
dicted points of the position of the hand;
 c3  pSMALLðgPosðtþ 1ÞÞ, c4  pBIGðgPosðtþ 1ÞÞ are predicted
points of the goal position;
 w1¼pðG¼SMALLjhShapeð1:tÞÞ andw2¼pðG¼BIGjhShapeð1 :tÞÞ
are predictions of grasping action computed on the basis of
the hand preshape models;
 w3 ¼ pðG ¼ SMALLjOBSð1 : tÞÞ and w4 ¼pðG¼BIGjOBSð1 : tÞÞ
are beliefs about the currently performed grasping action.
where OBSð1 : tÞ denotes the sequence of previous
observations.
The coefficients of the map and the relative salience of the
elements within it (hand and objects) depend on the outputs
of the generative models described earlier. For the hand
salience maps, the centre of Gaussians was based on the
forward models of hand position under the precision grip (or
power grasp) hypothesis, while the “weight” of the mapw1 (or
w2) is calculated based on the forward model of preshape in-
formation under the precision grip (or power grasp) hypoth-
esis. In other words, salience of hand position expected under
the precision grip (or power grasp) hypothesis is higher when
the hand is correctly configured for a precision grip (or power
grasp). This is because, in the empirical study we are model-
ling, only preshape depends on the performer's goal (while
hand position is uninformative); however, the same model
can be readily expanded to integrate (in a Bayesian manner)
other sources of evidence; such as the actor's hand position
and gaze (Ambrosini, Pezzulo, & Costantini, 2015). Further-
more, the salience of the small (or the big) object, and the
“weight” of the map w3 (or w4), corresponds to the probability
that the performer agent is executing a precision grip (or
130
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10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016power grasp), given the current observations. Specifically, it is
calculated as the posterior probability of the small (or big)
object hypothesis multiplied by a Gaussian term N(hPos;
gPos,s) that essentially describes hand-object distance. The
Gaussian is centred on the object position (gPos) and hPos is
the hand position. The s of the Gaussian is the uncertainty
about the posterior probability of the small (or big) object
hypothesis. Overall, Rk represents a dynamic (and fading)
snapshot of the current belief of the perceived action based on
the observation of the trajectories and preshape of the sub-
jects' hands.
The most salient zones of the saliency map of Fig. 2C
represent the most informative locations of the visual scene;
i.e., those that are expected to disambiguate alternative hy-
potheses. Therefore, the map does not simply include spatial
information (e.g., the expected position of the hand), but also
information about the (epistemic) value of the observations
(e.g., a hand preshaped for power grasp) one can harvest by
looking at these positions, given the current belief state of the
agent. Hence, hypothesis testing e or the active sampling for
the most relevant information e corresponds to selecting the
most salient location for the next saccade. Note that this is a
dynamical process: the saliency map is continuously updated
reflecting the changing beliefs of the agent.
2.5. Modelling perceptual decisions in action observation
In the action observation paradigmwe simulated, participants
were not explicitly asked to decide (between “small” or “big”
hypotheses) but their “decision” was inferred by measuring
their gaze behaviour; i.e., saccade towards one of the two
objects, big or small (Ambrosini et al., 2011). In the same way,
in the computational model, updates of the agent's belief and
saliency map terminate when the (artificial) eye lands on one
of the two objects e signalling the agent's decision. As we will
see, in both the human experiment and the model, with suf-
ficient information, saccades can be proactive rather than just
tracking themoving hand, and participants fixate the selected
target before the action is completed.
Note that, in themodel, the decision (i.e., the fixation to the
selected object) emerges naturally from saliency dynamics,
which in turn reflect belief updating during hypothesis
testing, without an explicit decision criterion (e.g., look at the
big object when you are certainty about it). This is because
actions are always sampled from the same salience map,
which implicitly indicates whether the hand or one of the
objects is most contextually salient. In other words, the de-
cision is made when the target location becomesmore salient
than the other locations (e.g., the hand location), not when the
agent has reached a predefined criterion, e.g., a fixed confi-
dence level. This lack of a “threshold” or criterion for the de-
cision marks an important difference with common place
models of decision-making such as the drift diffusion model
(Ratcliff, 1978) and is a hallmark of embodiedmodels of choice
that consider action and perception as mutually interactive
rather than modularized systems (Lepora & Pezzulo, 2015).
Key to this result e and the implicit shift from hand-
tracking to the fixation of the selected object e is the fact
that the posterior probability that one of the two objects willerception as hypothesis testing, Cortex (2017), http://dx.doi.org/
c o r t e x x x x ( 2 0 1 7 ) 1e1 68
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
CORTEX1929_proof ■ 13 February 2017 ■ 8/16be grasped is continuously updated when new visual samples
are collected and can eventually become high enough to drive
a saccade (i.e., one of the objects can assume more salience
than the hand). This, in turn, depends on the fact that when
the probability of a power versus precision grip is updated
(Fig. 2A) the probability of the big versus small object is also
updated (Fig. 2B), reflecting the implicit knowledge of the
intentionality of the action (e.g., that big objects require a
power grasp). In sum, if the agent does not know the goal, as in
this perceptual paradigm, it has to accumulate evidence first
by looking at the hand, and then look at the target when it has
resolved its uncertainty.
As an illustrative example, Fig. 3 shows a sequence of
(unfiltered) saliency maps along the six time frames of a
sample run. Here, the brighter areas correspond to the most
salient locations (recall that the most salient area is selected
for the next saccade). One can see a shift in the saliency map,
such that, by the third frame, the most salient object is the to-
be-grasped big object. Below we test the behaviour of the
model by directly comparing it with human data.88
89
90
91
92
93
943. Results
We tested the computational model on the visual stimuli used
by Ambrosini et al. (2011), which include action observation inFig. 3 e A sample saliency map, shown during 6 time frames. Th
over time as the actors action unfolds. This map encodes percep
configuration) as well as the expected informational or epistem
high-saliency locations. Note that the saliency map is updated
state of the observer or agent. At the time frame T2, the most s
sampled from the most salient locations in the saliency map, t
object, even if the hand has not yet reached it.
Please cite this article in press as: Donnarumma, F., et al., Action p
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016four (2 2) conditions, which derive from the combination of 2
target conditions (big or small object) and 2 shape conditions
(pre-shape or no-shape). As a result, the four conditions
correspond to four types of hand actions: “no-shapeebig
target”, “no-shapeesmall target” (i.e., a hand movement with
the fist closed to the big or small target, respectively), “pre-
shapeebig target”, and “pre-shapeesmall target” (i.e., a hand
movement with a power grasp or a precision grip to grasp the
big or small object, respectively).
To compare the results of the original study and the simu-
lations, we calculated the arrival time for the simulated sac-
cades as the difference between the timewhen the hand (of the
actor) and the saccade (of the simulated agent) land on the
target object. Note that arrival time is negative when the eye
lands on the object before the hand. Note also that our simu-
lations include one simplification: saccades have a fixed
duration (of 192 msec, which stems from the fact that before a
saccade the inference algorithm performs 16 iterations, each
assumed to last 12 msec). These parameters were selected for
consistency with previous work using the saccadic eye move-
ment model (Friston et al., 2012) and to ensure that the simu-
lated saccadic duration is within the average range for humans
(Leigh & Zee, 2015). Given that both saccades and videos have
fixed duration, every trial comprises exactly 6 epochs.
The results of our simulations are remarkably similar to
those of the original study (Fig. 4). The key result is ae figure shows how the saliency map (as in Fig. 2C) evolves
tual aspects of the observed scene (e.g., hand position and
ic value (salience) of the percept. Bright areas correspond to
during action observation, reflecting the changing belief
alient location is the big object. Since actions (gazes) are
he agent is more likely in it a proactive saccade to the big
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Fig. 4 e Results of the simulations, arrival time. Every
iteration lasts 12 msec. For simplicity, saccades are
assumed to have a fixed duration of 16 £ 12 ¼ 192 msec.
Arrival time is calculated as the difference between the
time when the hand (of the actor) and the eye (of the
participant) land on the object, as in the original study of
Ambrosini et al. (2011). It is negative when the eye lands
on the object before the hand. Note that arrival times for
the big object (power grasp) are more anticipatory than for
the small object (precision grip). This phenomena was also
observed in the simulations (compare Figs. 5 and 6).
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CORTEX1929_proof ■ 13 February 2017 ■ 9/16significant advantage for the pre-shape over the no-shape
condition, for both power grasp and precision grip. This
result stems from the fact that in the pre-shape, information
about the actor's goal can be inferred from the hand move-
ment kinematics, enabling an anticipatory saccade to the
target to confirm the agent's (or participant's) beliefs.
This difference can be appreciated by looking at Figs. 5 and
6, which show sample simulations for each of the four
experimental conditions. Fig. 5 shows side-by-side exemplar
simulations of power grasp without preshape (left) and with
preshape information (right). Fig. 6 shows side-by-side
example simulations of precision grip without preshape
(left) and with preshape information (right). Panels A of Figs. 5
and 6 report the probability of the two competing hypotheses
(here, big vs small, aka power grasp vs precision grip) during
observation. One can see that in the condition without pre-
shape, the probability of the two hypotheses only becomes
significantly different late in the trajectory.
Furthermore, we observe a significant difference between a
reactive hand-following gaze strategy, which emerges in the
no-shape condition, and an anticipatory gaze strategy, which
emerges in the pre-shape condition, shortly after the begin-
ning of a trial. This difference is evident if one considers
panels B and C of Figs. 5 and 6, which show the location of the
saccade in the video frame and the saliencymap, respectively;
and panels I of the same figures, which show the sequence of
saccades during the experiment (note that the first saccade is
always from the centre to the initial hand movement. This
reflects the fact that in the human experiment, participants
were asked to fixate on the actor's hand before watching thePlease cite this article in press as: Donnarumma, F., et al., Action p
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016video; however, this first saccade was ignored in the analysis).
Heuristically, at the beginning of a trial, there is little infor-
mation in the position of the hand that can inform beliefs
about the target. Therefore, the most salient locations to
sample are the hand itself, in the hope that its configuration
will portend the ultimate movement. However, as time pro-
gresses and the hand approaches its target, the identity of the
nearest object resolves more uncertainty about the intended
movement. One would therefore anticipate saccades to the
object at later points in the trajectory, with an implicit
reporting of the final belief (or decision) by a saccade to the
target object. Clearly, the above strategywill onlyworkwhen a
hand is pre-configured in an informative way. If the configu-
ration of the hand does not emerge (or emerges later) in the
trajectory, the hand should be tracked more closely e in
search (or anticipation) of an informative change in
configuration.
This latter observation highlights the importance of
generative models in driving eye movements during action
observation. If observed movements do not resolve uncer-
tainty about the performer's action goals, eye movements
cannot be proactive. The importance of generative models for
proactive eye movements was highlighted in a study by
Costantini et al. (2014). The authors used repetitive trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to induce “virtual le-
sions” in participants that performed a task equivalent to the
one described here. The results of the experiment show that
eye movements become reactive when the virtual lesion is
applied to the left ventral premotor cortex (PMv) e an area
thought to be part of a forward model for action execution.
The same study showed that virtual lesions to the posterior
part of the STS do not produce equivalent impairments. In
predictive codingmodels of action observation and the mirror
neuron system (MNS), STS is considered to lie at a low level of
the (putative) MNS hierarchy, possibly coding (highly pro-
cessed) perceptual aspects of biological motion. This result is
thus compatible with the notion that it is specifically the
motor-prediction aspect of the generative model that is
crucial for hypothesis testing, not (high-order) visual pro-
cessing; but this interpretation demands more scrutiny in
future research.
Finally, in both the original study and our simulations, the
“big” hypothesis is discriminated faster than the “small” hy-
pothesis. This may be due to a greater salience of movement
kinematics elicited in the context of the power grasp: the ESGP
model for power grasp has overall lower uncertainty than the
ESGP model for precision grip (compare Figs. 5F and 6F). In
other words, both human participants and ourmodelsmay be
sensitive to subtle (and early) kinematic cues that emerge
earlier under power grasps. In the original report, it was sug-
gested that this advantagemay also a have perceptual nature,
and participants may select the big object as their default
option (perhaps because it is more perceptually salient). We
tested this notion using a (small) prior probability for the big
hypothesis (implemented via a Gaussian centred on .57 with
variance .01). This did not influence our results; either in
terms of discriminating the big target movements earlier or in
terms of the differences in action recognition with and
without preshape information.erception as hypothesis testing, Cortex (2017), http://dx.doi.org/
Fig. 5 e Results of sample simulations of power grasp, without preshape (left) or with preshape (right). Panel A shows the
expected probability of the two competing hypotheses (here, big vs small) during an exemplar trial. Panels B and C show the
location of the saccade in the video frame and the saliency map, respectively. Panel D shows the hidden (oculomotor) states
as computed by the model. Panel E show the actual content of what is sampled by a saccade (in the filtered map). Panel F
shows the posterior beliefs about the ‘true’ hypothesis (expectations are in blue and associated uncertainty are in grey). The
posterior beliefs are plotted in terms of expected log probabilities and associated 90% confidence interval. A value of zero
corresponds to an expected probability of one. Increases in conditional confidence about the expected log probability
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We have shown that the dynamics of eye movements
described by active inference e an extension of the predictive
coding formalism to the domain of action e correctly repro-
duce human behaviour in a series of action observation tasks.
This model rests on two intertwined notions. First, action
observation can be described formally as hypothesis testing, or
the active sampling of salient information, as informed by the
agent's predictions. Second, the process relies on an internal
generative model that generates predictions of the next sensory
sample (conditioned on the agent's competing perceptual
hypotheses). These two components act synergistically: the
predictions of the generativemodel are used to update a visual
saliency map, which serves to direct saccades to the most
informative parts of the visual scene (active sampling). In
turn, active sampling provides evidential input to the gener-
ative model, which is used to update the predictions and the
probability of competing hypotheses.
The first innovative aspect of our proposal entails casting
action observation as the inferential process of hypothesis
testing and not (for example) as a classification or resonance
mechanism, or one in which the observing agent passively
receives (rather than actively sampling) information. Our
hypothesis thus contrasts with models that describe action
understanding as a resonance (Rizzolatti et al., 1996) or a
Hebbian (Keysers & Perrett, 2004) mechanism. It also con-
trasts with accounts of action observation as a purely visual
recognition task (Fleischer et al., 2013). Our proposal is
related to various models that include predictive mecha-
nisms and forward models for action understanding
(Demiris, 2007; Dindo et al., 2011; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato,
2003) and concomitant attentional allocation (Demiris &
Khadhouri, 2005; Ognibene & Demiris, 2013). However, our
model significantly differs from all the aforementioned
models, because, first, it uses eye movements and hypothe-
sis testing in the action understanding process, and second,
it adopts an active inference scheme that dispenses with any
form of inverse model (Friston, 2011). From a broader
perspective, one can consider the perceiver's actions to be
essential for action understanding and, more generally, to
cognitive processing at large (Engel, Maye, Kurthen, & K€onig,
2013; Pezzulo, 2008, 2011; Pezzulo & Cisek, 2016). Here, two
kinds of actions are essential for action understanding: overt
and covert. The former are the eye movements and the
saccades that are used as “experiments” that permit hy-
pothesis testing; that is, active perception (Bajcsy et al., 2016;
Gibson, 1966). The latter are the covert reactivations of the
sensorimotor system (and its generative model) that permit
generating predictions; that is, motor cognition (Jeannerod,
2006; Pezzulo et al., 2011).correspond to a shrinking of the confidence intervals. Panel G s
hypotheses weighted by the posterior expectation, which in this
of the previous time steps. Panel H shows the sequence of sacc
hand depends on participants' instructions and can be ignored
preshape, gaze follows a reactive, hand-following strategy (pane
trial (panels A and F). The scenario is different in the (right) cas
122
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10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016This latter point leads us to a second important aspect of
our proposal. Our account of action observation is in keeping
with embodied and motor cognition theories, especially if the
generative model used for hypothesis testing is used for per-
forming goal-directed actions (Flanagan& Johansson, 2003). In
the social domain, support for this view comes from a variety
of sources, including studies of motor activation during action
observation, or interference effects between observed and
performed actions (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008;
Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2006; Kilner, Paulignan, &
Blakemore, 2003; Umilta et al., 2001), see Kilner and Lemon
(2013) for a review. This sort of evidence has motivated a va-
riety of theoretical and computational models of motor
involvement in action observation (Demiris & Khadhouri,
2005; Friston et al., 2011; Ognibene & Demiris, 2013;
Ognibene, Chinellato, Sarabia, & Demiris, 2013; Wolpert
et al., 2003), see Giese and Rizzolatti (2015) for a review. Our
model significantly advances the state of the art by assigning
the motor system a role in hypothesis testing during action
observation, too. Direct support for this idea, which is rarely
addressed in models of action observation, comes from
studies that show that saccades essentially cease to be pre-
dictive and most often simply follow the moving hand in
various conditions that prevent the recruitment of the motor
system: when the motor system is compromised with TMS
(Costantini et al., 2014) or engaged in an interfering task
(Costantini, Ambrosini, & Sinigaglia, 2012), when hands are
tied (Ambrosini, Sinigaglia, & Costantini, 2012), or the
perceiver does not include the observed action in her reper-
toire (Ambrosini et al., 2013).
A third innovative aspect of our proposal is that it parsi-
moniously explains eye movements dynamics as the emer-
gent effect of using (and updating) a saliency map e that is, a
domain-general mechanism that dispenses from any ad-hoc
or task-specific criterion (e.g., a decision threshold or crite-
rion). In this respect, it is important to emphasize that the
notion of a saliency map does not reduce to a series of filters
(or other mechanisms) that capture perceptual features in a
bottom-up way, as usually assumed in the literature. Rather,
the contribution of top-down, hypothesis-driven predictions
is essential in updating the content of the map (e.g., which
objects are expected and where) and the saliency assigned to
each location (e.g., how important is a saccade to each loca-
tion for testing the current hypotheses) e which is in keeping
with theories that highlight top-down processes in visual
perception (Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Rothkopf et al., 2007;
Tatler et al., 2013), see also Corbetta and Shulman (2002).
The possibility to assign salience to locations that encode
goals (for action execution or observation) distinguish this
approach from alternative proposals that focus on the infor-
mation gain afforded by low-level properties of the visual
stimuli (Itti & Koch, 2000).how the “percept” of the system e that is, the mixture of
study is represented with a superposition of all the frames
ades during the experiment (where the first saccade to the
, see the main text). Note that in the (left) case without
ls G and H) and the action is disambiguated fairly late in the
e with preshape information.
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Fig. 6 e Results of sample simulations of precision grip, without preshape (left) or with preshape (right). Labels as in Fig. 5.
Note that even in these sample simulations, the (right) scenario with preshape entails faster recognition and proactive
movements compared to the (left) scenario without preshape.
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CORTEX1929_proof ■ 13 February 2017 ■ 12/16Furthermore, our approach entails a systems-level
perspective on action understanding. The importance of brain
mechanisms such asmirror neurons in action recognition has
been often recognized, but clearly these neurons (like anyPlease cite this article in press as: Donnarumma, F., et al., Action p
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016other neuron) operate within much larger brain networks for
adaptive action and perception. This implies the necessity of a
systems-level view of action recognition, which clearly rec-
ognizes the role of large cortical areas and cortico-subcorticalerception as hypothesis testing, Cortex (2017), http://dx.doi.org/
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CORTEX1929_proof ■ 13 February 2017 ■ 13/16loops (Bonini, 2016; Caligiore et al., 2013). The systems-level
architectural scheme of Fig. 1 e despite it is necessarily
simplified and incomplete e represents a first step in this di-
rection. Addressing action understanding within a large-scale
biological model like active inference permits to generate
specific predictions on the role of different brain areas in this
process.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that we have tested the
validity of the model at the behavioural level, and its capacity
to explain different patterns of (proactive or reactive) eye
movements by appealing to a single imperative of uncertainty
(i.e., expected surprise or variational free energy) minimiza-
tion. Clearly, there are several other aspects of the proposal
that remain to be tested in more detail. One advantage of our
computational approach is that enables the estimation of
hidden variables from behavioural data. For example, panels D
and F of Figs. 5 and 6 show the hidden (oculomotor) states and
the agent's current uncertainty, respectively. These measures
(and others) are automatically inferred by the model and can
be used for model-based, trial-by-trial computational analysis
of neurobiological data, such as for example dynamical mea-
sures of brain activation such as EEG or MEG (Daw, 2009;
Friston et al., 2014), thus productively linking various levels
and timescales of action observation, behavioural and
neuronal. This reflects the fact that the proposed model gen-
erates a variety of empirical predictions, concerning for
example the ways action e or belief-related brain signals
(Panels D and F in Figs. 5 and 6) e change during trials with
high or low uncertainty, or when the motor system is
temporarily inactivated (Costantini et al., 2014), which can be
tested empirically. Another prediction is that, because action
understanding is an active process, modulations of the hy-
pothesis testing mechanism would influence it; for example,
that it would be possible to bias action understanding by
restricting eye movements.
Compared to the original model of Friston et al. (2012),
there are threemain differences. The first difference is the fact
that the perceptual stimulus is dynamical (a video and not an
image), and for this, the two perceptual hypotheses corre-
spond to image sequences not images. The second difference
lies in the way the saliency map is computed e here, it does
not depend on perceptual features of the to-be-recognized
objects but on motor predictions. The third important differ-
ence between the current scheme and that described by
Friston and colleagues is that we eschew an ad hoc inhibition
of return e which they included because their generative
model did not have any memory. This meant that the simu-
lated agent forgot what it had learned from sampling a pre-
vious location and would keep on returning to the most
salient visual features in the absence of inhibition of return.
Our more realistic setup precludes this because the model
generates trajectories that unfold over time. This means that
what was salient on the previous saccade is usually less
salient on the subsequent saccade. This follows from the fact
that our generative model encodes trajectories and therefore
has an implicit memory, in the sense that it can accumulate
information over time about the underlying causes of sensory
information.
The idea of a reuse of motor strategies to support percep-
tual functions has been raised in several domains. One earlyPlease cite this article in press as: Donnarumma, F., et al., Action p
10.1016/j.cortex.2017.01.016example was (the motor theory of) speech perception
(Liberman & Mattingly, 1985; Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler,
& Kennedy, 1967). Our proposal here is in accordance to one
central claim of this and other motor theories of cognition
(Jeannerod, 2006), namely, that perceptual processing reuses
the generative or forward models implied in motor control. In
our study, however, the contribution of generative models
(and the motor system) is quite specific: guiding eye move-
ments and supporting active hypothesis testing. As our sim-
ulations and the experimental data show, engaging the
generative models is not mandatory for action recognition,
but improves it by making eye movements more proactive. In
other words, our simulations show that one can assign sa-
liency to current stimuli (observed movements) and solve the
same task in various ways: reactively (by following the hand),
by extrapolating perceptual variables over time, or by
engaging the generative models (and the motor system).
However, reactive strategies may be limited and visual
extrapolationmay fail to correctly represent sequential events
that are generated by hidden causes (e.g., the dynamics of the
motor system) and have an intrinsic intentionality; otherwise,
the generative model underlying visual extrapolations would
be essentially a duplicate of the generative model underlying
action execution. Another problemwith a visual extrapolation
explanation is that it is not immediately clear why eye
movements should go proactively to the object (and not, for
example, any future predicted location before the object)
without a notion that grasping the object is the agent's goal.
While it may not be mandatory to engage the (generative
model of the)motor system to solve this specific task, doing so
would automatically produce an advance understanding of
the situation that is speaks to one's own action goals (“motor
understanding”); in turn, this may have additional benefits
such as segmenting action observation in meaningful (e.g.,
goal and subgoal-related ways, Donnarumma, Maisto, &
Pezzulo, 2016; Stoianov, Genovesio, & Pezzulo, 2015) and
permitting fast planning of complementary or adversarial
actions in social settings (Pezzulo, 2013; Pezzulo, Iodice,
Donnarumma, Dindo, & Knoblich, 2017).
In this illustration of epistemic foraging under active
inference, we have focused on information gain in the context
of action observation. On this view, salience becomes a sort of
“epistemic affordance”, where the affordance of different lo-
cations (hand or objects) changes dynamically as a function of
the agent's beliefse and therefore becomes inherently context
sensitive. It is interesting to note that other studies using
active inference (but in simplified, Markovian or discrete time
scheme) appeal to exactly the same idea, but in the domain of
goal-directed action, e.g., finding reward in a maze. In these
studies, when agents are uncertain about reward locations,
they first need to resolve their uncertainty through epistemic
action that entails information gain (e.g., they search for cues
that disambiguate a reward location). Resolving this uncer-
tainty is a prerequisite to successively execute a pragmatic
action (e.g., reaching the reward location). The resulting
mixture of epistemic and pragmatic value turns out to be the
free energy expected under any sequence of actions or policy.
In short, the active inference we have demonstrated in this
work has a construct validity in terms of recent work on more
abstract formulations of exploration and exploitation (Fristonerception as hypothesis testing, Cortex (2017), http://dx.doi.org/
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1155. Conclusions
This paper offers a potentially important and novel formula-
tion of action observation that generalizes active inference
based on epistemic foraging (foraging for information) and
visual salience. In short, we consider the driving force behind
saccadic eye movements to be the resolution of uncertainty
about competing explanations for the causes of sensory in-
formation e in our case study, whether an actor is reaching a
small or a big object. This can be formulated in terms of sa-
liency maps that encode the information gain (or epistemic
value) of sampling the next location in the visual field. In turn,
this depends upon predictions about the likely configuration
of the world based upon a forward or generative model of
unfolding events (i.e., the prediction of the hand movement
and shape, depending on the actor's goal of grasping a small or
a big object). This construction is both principled and
straightforward: it differs fundamentally from previous
treatments of salience, because salience becomes an explicit
function of beliefs and predictions about the future and can be
constructed on line in a Bayes-optimal fashion. Furthermore,
our work provides a formal perspective on mirror neuron-like
activity and the key role of active vision in coupling perception
and action. This paper presents the basic ideas and estab-
lishes their construct validity by showing that one can
reproduce (with remarkable accuracy) key phenomena
observed in empirical studies of eye movement dynamics
during action observation. The ability to model, in formal
terms, action observation may have important implications
for the modelling of both eye movements and their neuronal
correlates.
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